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Search and Seizure of a Third-Party Newspaper: Zurcher, Chief of Police of
Palo Alto v. Stanford Daily '—On April 9, 1971, nine officers of the Palo Alto
Police Department were assaulted while attempting to disperse a demonstra-
tion at the Stanford University Hospital.' Two days later, the Stanford Daily,
the Stanford University student newspaper, published articles and photo-
graphs of the protest. 3 Although the Daily did not publish photographs of
the actual assault, the published pictures and text suggested that a Daily
photographer had been in the area of the assault." The following day, the
Santa Clara County Deputy District Attorney obtained a warrant to search the
Stanford Daily offices for negatives and photographs relevant to identifying
the assailants. The search warrant issued despite the failure of the warrant
application to allege that any Daily staff member had participated in the
crime. 3 A fifteen minute search of the Daily's photographic laboratories, fil-
ing cabinets, desks and wastebaskets, revealed only the photographs that had
been published on April 11, and no materials were seized as a result of the
search.° Although the police denied that they exceeded the bounds of the
warrant, the Daily claimed the officers had an opportunity to scan or read
confidential notes and correspondence.'
The Stanford Daily filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California against the issuing magistrate, the Santa Clara
chief of police, the District Attorney, and one of the Deputy District Attor-
neys, as well as the officers who conducted the search."' The plaintiffs claim,
brought under Section 1983,9 alleged that the search violated the Daily's first,
fourth, and fourteenth amendment rights.'° Upon the Daily's motion for
' 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
2 Id. at 550-51. Apparently, while stationed at the east end of the building—
away from their fellow officers, bystanders and reporters—the officers were charged
by demonstrators armed with sticks and clubs. All the officers were injured and the
hospital area was severely damaged by the violence. The police were able to identify
only two of the assailants prior to the search. Id.
3 Id. at 551. The college press has the full panoply of first amendment rights.
Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460-61 (4th Cir. 1973) (official university news-
paper); Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 574-75 (5th Cir. 1973) (campus literary
magazine); Scoville v, Board of Ed. of Joliet Tp. H.S. Dist. 204, 425 F.2d 10, 13 (7th
Cir. 1970) (underground high school newspaper); Dickey v. Alabama St. Bd. of Ed.,
273 F. Supp. 613, 618 (N.D. Ala. 1967) (state college newspaper); cf. Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (establishment of S.D.S. chapter); Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (black-armband protest).
▪ 436 U.S. 551.
• Id.
6 Id. at 551-52.
7 Id.
▪ 353 F. Supp. 124, 125-26 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
" Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 	 1983 (1976). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and the Laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
1° 353 F. Supp. at 124-25.
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summary judgment, the district court granted declaratory relief," holding
that the fourth and fourteenth amendments forbid the issuance of a warrant
to search the property of one not suspected of criminal involvement absent
probable cause to believe that the objects sought might be destroyed or re-
moved from the jurisdiction.' 2 In the district court's opinion, a subpoena
duces tecum was the proper vehicle for discovering the objects, except when
probable cause exists to believe that, if given advance warning, the object's
possessor would frustrate their discovery.' : Additionally, the, district court
held that when the innocent third-party is a newspaper, first amendment pro-
tections render unannounced searches impermissible except upon a clear
showing that important materials likely would be destroyed or removed from
the jurisdiction despite a restraining order." The respondents appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which per curiam
adopted the district court's opinion." The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari. 16
In a five to three decision," the Supreme Court reversed and HELD: the
fourth amendment does not forbid the issuance of a warrant to search for
and seize evidence of a crime simply because the owner or possessor of the
place to be searched is not then implicted in the crime. Moreover, when ad-
ministered with particular exactitude, the warrant requirements of the fourth
amendment .adequately safeguard In-st amendment vaues." Essentially, this
" Id. at 136.
12 Id. at 127, 132-33. For an analysis of the district court's opinion, see 86
HARV. L. REV. 1317 (1973).
13 Id. at 132-33.
14 Id. at 135. There is reason to speculate whether a subpoena would have
been practicable under the circumstances of this case. On the one hand, the Santa
Clara County Grand Jury—the body before which a subpoena duces 1ecum is
returnable—met two hours after the warrant was executed. Id. at 127. This suggests
that a subpoena would have been as convenient and timely as a warrant. On the other
hand, in policy statements published prior to the incident, the Daily had stated that it
was under "no obligation to help in the prosecution of students for crime related to
political activity" and that "negatives which [could] he used to convict protestors
[would' be destroyed." Brief for Petitioners Zurcher at 9, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547 (1978), reprinted in 9 LAW REPRINTS (Criminal Law No. 24) at 123; see also
436 U.S. at 568-69 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring). Although these statements support an
inference of non–cooperation and though the officer requesting the warrant said that
the Daily's policy factored heavily in his choice of action, the statements were not sub-
mitted to the magistrate in the warrant affidavit. Brief for Petitioner Zurcher at 9; 353
F. Supp. at 135 n.16.
550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
434 U.S. 816 (1977).
436 U.S. at 548. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. He was
joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger. Justice
Powell also filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stewart dissented; he was joined by
Justice Marshall. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion. Justice Brennan
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
436 U.S. at 560, 565. The Supreme Court decision represented a swift re-
versal of both the district court, and appellate court opinions. An unarticulated reason
for the disagreement between the courts may have been their divergent view of first
amendment philosophy. For example, in Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358




holding was grounded upon three considerations. First, the Supreme Court
noted that nothing in the fourth amendment, nor in the history of its con-
struction, prohibits or limits the issuance of warrants to search non-suspect
property.' 9 Second, in the Court's opinion, the critical element in assessing
the reasonableness of a search is not the owner's culpability, but the existence
of probable cause to believe that the specific items sought are located on property
to be searched." Third, the Court explained that prior cases requiring con-
sideration of first amendment values in fourth amendment procedure de-
mand only a careful application of the requirements of probable cause,
specificity, and overall reasonableness before a valid warrant may issue."
Concurring with the Zurcher majority, Justice Powell re-emphasized the
lack of constitutional authority for exempting the press from the reach of the
fourth amendment. 22 Justice Powell's opinion asserted that the fourth
amendment itself strikes a balance between the government and the press,
allowing the Court little power or authority to rule otherwise." Justices
Stewart and Marshall were of the dissenting opinion that search warrants di-
rected against the press endanger its first amendment freedoms. The dissent-
ers argued that a search chills the confidential news sources upon which the
nom, Branz.burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), both the United States Court for the
Northern District of California and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that journalists have a qualified first amendment privilege to refuse to disclose confi-
dential information gathered in the normal course of business, unless the state can
show a compelling and overriding interest in the testimony. 311 F. Supp. at 360: 434
F.2d at 1089; 408 U.S. at 677-79. Even after the Supreme Court enunciated a contrary
interpretation in Branzburg, both the United States Court for the Northern District of
California and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit continued to recognize at
least conditional first amendment protection of news sources. Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher 353 F. Supp. 124, 132 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affd per curiam, 550 F.2d 464 (9th
Cir. 1977), rev'd., 436 U.S. at 553; Farr v: Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467-68 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); cf. Lewis v. United States, 501 F.2d 418,
422-23 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 913-14 (1975). Also compare KQED, Inc. v.
Houchins, 546 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1976) (press has greater constitutional right of
access to prisons and prisoners than does the general public) with Houchins v. KQED,
Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (press has no greater constitutional right of access to prison
information).
19 436 U.S. at 554. See text at notes 42-49 infra, The fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNisr. amend. IV.
2" 436 U.S. at 556. See text at notes 43-52 infra.
21 hi. at 565. See text at notes 104-111 infra. In pertinent part, the first
amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press ...•" U.S. CONST. amend. 1. Nor may state action abridge these liber-
ties, for the fourteenth amendment makes the first amendment binding upon the
states. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 362 and 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(1927).
22 436 U.S. at 570 (Powell, J., concurring).
23 Id. at 569.
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press and public rely for important information." In addition, the dissenting
Justices believed that the ex parte warrant procedure precludes an opportunity
for the adversary hearing which is generally required prior to any potential
invasion of first amendment rights. 25 In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens
dissented upon fourth amendment principles, stating that although a person's
culpability may justify an invasion of his or her privacy, in the absence of
culpability there must be a demonstrated need for an unannounced search by
force." To protect future privacy interests of innocent citizens, Justice Ste-
vens advocated the establishment of a higher standard of probable cause to
govern search and seizure of third-party property."
Search and seizure of the property of an innocent third-party newspaper
presents an unusual convergence of fourth and first amendment. priorities.
Thus, the Zurcher decision has the potential to alter the application of both
the fourth and first amendments. In strictly fourth amendment cases, Zurcher
represents the first clear enunciation by the Supreme Court that the search
and seizure of third-party property is reasonable upon adherence to tradi-
tional fourth amendment procedure, and therefore heralds heightened intru-
sions into the privacy of innocent third-parties. As to the first amendment,
Zurcher breaks new ground by holding that the free press clause offers news-
papers no protection from search and seizure beyond that provided by the
fourth amendment. In this regard, Zurcher endangers the free flow of news
and information encouraged by the first amendment.
This casenote will review the procedure established in Zurcher for the
search and seizure of the property of an innocent third-party newpaper. First,
it will consider the propriety of third-party searches in the light of the fourth
amendment's requirement of reasonableness. Second, fourth amendment pro-
cedure will be re-examined when the search touches upon first amendment
interests. Last, the casenote will question whether search or seizure of the
press impairs first amendment rights and whether a workable standard can be
established to balance competing interests. It will be submitted that the fourth
amendment's requirement of reasonableness and the constitutional proscrip-
tion against overbroad state infringement of first amendment liberties, pro-
hibit the search and seizure of an innocent third-party newspaper when some
less drastic means of investigation is available.
I. THIRD-PARTY SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Pre-Zurcher Authority
It is within government power to seize property from private citizens dur-
ing the course of a criminal investigation. The constitutional exercise of this
power is subject to the limitations present in the fourth amendment." The
24 Id. at 571-72 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 575-76.
26 Id. at 581, 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 582-83. See text at notes 98-99 infra.
28 See note 19 supra.
May 1979]	 CASENOTES	 787
fourth amendment provides that a warrant may issue upon the order of a
neutral magistrate, 29 following an affirmation 30 and a finding of probable
cause to believe that evidence will be found on the premises to be searched."
To be valid, a warrant must specifically describe both the premises to be
searched and the property to be seized. 32 In addition to these warrant re-
quirements, the fourth amendment states that the scope and manner of the
search must be reasonable. 33 Typically, property possessed by the criminal
himself is the object of search and seizure. There are instances, however,
when inculpable individuals possess evidence relevant to a criminal investiga-
tion. The fourth amendment is silent as to the propriety of the search and
seizure of these "third-parties."
The Zurcher holding is the Court's first clear enunciation of a fourth
amendment standard for third-party search and seizure. 34 Prior to 1967,
innocent third-parties rarely were subject to search, since at that time the
Supreme Court interpreted the fourth amendment as confining a search war-
rant's authority to the seizure of contraband, stolen goods, and instrumen-
talities of crime. 35 Third-party searches were unheard of because it was rare
that an innocent party would possess property of a character which was sub-
ject to seizure. In 1967, the Court in Warden v. Hayden" overruled earlier
29 See e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U:S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
3° See e.g., Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1933); accord, Agui-
lar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112, 114-16 (1964).
31 See text and notes at notes 45-46, 69-70 infra.
32 See e.g., Steele v. United States No. 1, 267 U.S. 498, 501, 503 (1925).
33 See text and notes at notes 71-75 infra. Even those searches permitted with-
out a warrant are subject to the fourth amendment notions of reasonableness, proba-
ble cause and judicial evaluation. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968). See also
cases cited at note 86 infra.
34 436 U.S. at 550, 554-55. While there was no authority prohibiting third-
party search or seizures, at the time of the district court opinion, it appears that
neither was there any federal or state case approving such actions. Presently, such
approval has come from the Sixth Circuit, In United States v. Manufacturer's Nat'l
Bank of Detroit, 536 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. 429 U.S. 1039
(1977), the Sixth Circuit upheld the search of a third—party's safe deposit box and the
seizure of its contents, stating:
Appellants argue that as "... innocent and uninvolved third parties, [they]
were deprived of their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights due to failure
of the government to utilize a subpoena duces tecum or demonstrate its
impracticality before applying for a warrant to search...." Once it is estab-
lished that probable cause exists to believe a federal crime has been com-
mitted a warrant may issue for the search of any property which the magis-
trate has probable cause to believe may [conceal] evidence of the crime.
. . . We are not persuaded that the contrary rule adopted by the district
court in Stanford Daily v. Zurcher . . . is required by either the Fourth or
Fifth Amendment or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
536 F.2d at 702-03. Cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b): "A warrant may be issued under this
rule to search for and seize and (1) property that constitutes evidence of the commis-
sion of a criminal offense ..."
25 See e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.145, 154 (1947); Gouled v. United
States, 244 U.S. 298, 308 (1921); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
36 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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case taw so as to permit seizure of all property of evidential value. A result of
the Hayden holding was to subject persons fortuitously connected with crime
to a search for property in their possession which might reasonably lead to
the apprehension of criminals. Hayden itself, however, did not involve a
third-party seizure. 37 Specifically, Hayden validated the seizure of an armed
robbery suspect's clothing during a warrantless search of an apartment, while
the police were in hot pursuit of the felon." Therefore, it is open to ques-
tion whether the Court intended the Hayden decision to expand the reach of
ordinary search and seizure laws to embrace the search of citizens so remotely
connected with the crime. In this regard, the Hayden COurt remarked that
current standards of fourth amendment procedure should be re-evaluated in
the light of the decision's breadth."
B. The Zurcher Standard for Third-Party Search and Seizure
In Zurcher, the Court squarely faced the third-party search issue created
in Hayden, but declined to re-evaluate fourth amendment standards. The ini-
tial contention which the Zurcher Court considered was the claim that a war-
rant should not issue to search third-party property, despite demonstrated
probable cause, unless it was also shown that a subpoena duces tecum would be
an impracticable alternative. This was the standard adopted by the district
court." The Supreme Court, however, rejected the proposed standard on
the basis that it would require, prior to any search, that the state establish
probable cause to believe that the property owner was implicated in the
crime.'" Such a requirement, the Court stated, runs counter to well-
established construction and application of the fourth amendment. 42
In its analysis of the district court's holding, the Supreme Court
highlighted the property focus of fourth amendment search procedure. In
this regard, the Court emphasized that warrants to search and seize are di-
rected at property, not persons." Normally, an invasion of privacy becomes
37 Id. at 303-04.
38 Id. at 208-99.
39 Id. at 307. See 436 U.S. at 577-78, 582 n.I I (Stevens, J. dissenting).
40 See text and notes at notes 12-14 supra. On the basis of dicta from two
appellate level state decisions, the district court concluded that even warranted third-
party searches are unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Neither of these deci-
sions, however, is proper authority for that proposition. One of these cases, Owens v.
Way, 141 Ga. 796, 82 S.E. 132 (1914), invalidated the power of an officer to seize
property of a third person under the authority of a warrant to arrest the accused. Id.
at 798, 82 S.E. at 133. The second of these cases, Commodity Manufacturing Co., Inc.,
v. Moore, 198 N.Y.S.45 (Sup. Ct. 1923), was based upon the property rationale of the
"mere evidence" rule, which is no longer followed. Id. at 47; see cases cited at notes 35,
36 supra. The Supreme Court was highly critical of the district court's use of authority.
436 U.S. at 554 & n.5.
436 U.S. at 554.
42 Id. See text and notes at notes 29-33 supra.
43 436 U.S. at 555. Cf. Rakes v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, (White, J., dissenting)
(1978) (passenger with no property interest in auto searched or goods seized has no
standing to challenge legality of search).
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justifiable and a warrant may issue at a point when the state's reason to be-
lieve that incriminating evidence will be found on the premises becomes suffi-
ciently great." The Court noted that in criminal investigations, probable
cause to search—the standard under which a warrant may issue—is an in-
quiry directed solely towards ascertaining the presence of the objects sought
on the property to be searched. 45
 Indeed, as the Court pointed out,' when a
search is directed against a particular premise, the owner or occupant need
not be identified by the warrant." In this regard, the Court cited 47 the use
of probable cause established by Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and
County of San Francisco," which held that warrants to conduct routine adminis-
trative inspections of private dwellings to enforce municipal codes may issue
on an area-wide basis without specific knowledge of the condition of a par-
ticular premise and without regard to the owner's or occupant's culpability or
innocence. 49 In addition to the above considerations, the Court explained
that to require suspicion of the owner as an element of probable cause to
search and seize evidence, would unduly impose the requirement of a valid
arrest upon a warranted search." Never before has the right to search, and
the validity of a seizure, been contingent upon the right to arrest." From
44
 436 U.S. at 554; Fischer v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401) (1976).
" 436 U.S. at 554-56.
48 Id. at 555. A valid warrant is required to describe with particularity the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 {1976). But courts have uniformly held
that the fourth amendment does not require a warrant to describe the person from
whom the things will be seized. E.g., United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 155 n.I5
(1974) (dictum); United States v. Fiorella, 468 F.2d 688, 691 (2d Cir. 1972); Wangrow
v. United States, 399 F.2d 106, 115 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 933 (1968); Dixon
v. United States, 211 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1954).
47 436 U.S. at 554-56.
" 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967), overruling Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
4° 387 U.S. at 537-38. Accord, Marshall, Sec. of Labor v. Barlow, Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 320-21 (1978) (OSHA need show only that a specific business has been choosen
for inspection on the basis of a general administrative plan derived from neutral
sources); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 542 (1967) (Camara extended to adminis-
trative search of commercial premises).
5° 436 U.S. at 554. Presence of probable cause to arrest will not always support
the issuance of a search warrant; similarly, the presence of probable cause to search
will not necessarily justify an arrest. Each calls for a demonstration of somewhat differ-
ent facts. In the case of arrest, the conclusion concerns the guilt of the arrestee,
whereas in the case of search warrants, the conclusions concern the connection of the
items sought with the crime and their present location. Compare Giordenello v. United
States, 357 U.S 480, 485 (1958) (arrest) with Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
534-35 (1967) (search). See generally LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law
... Has not . . . Run Smooth," U. ILL. L.F. 255, 260-61 (1966); Comment, Search and
Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Cm. L. REV. 664,
687 (1961).
51 436 U.S. 554, 556-8, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In
Carroll, the Court said that where a car was stopped with the belief' that it was transport-
ing illegal liquor, the validity of the ensuing search and seizure was not dependent on
the right to arrest the occupant, but upon the presence of a reason to believe that the
car contained contraband. Id. at 158-59.
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these principles of fourth amendment procedure, the Court concluded that
probable cause to search turns not upon the culpability of the property owner
but the location of the evidence. 52
After establishing that a valid warrant may issue to search any property
which is reasonably believed to conceal objects or evidence of a crime, the
Court addressed and explicitly rejected" the district court's ruling that the
state must show that a subpoena duces tecum is an impracticable alternative
before a warrant may issue to seize the property of an innocent third-party.
To support its impracticability test," the district court relied principally upon
Bacon v. United States,55 which held that a warrant to arrest a material witness
may not issue unless there is probable cause to believe that it is impracticable
to secure his presence by subpoena." The district court maintained that
third-party search and seizure is analogous to the arrest of a material witness,
because in both situations the source of information is an innocent party. 57
Moreover, the district court reasoned that if an impracticability test is re-
quired in instances of third-party arrests, it should also be applied in cases of
third-party search, because courts have defended individuals from unlawful
seizures as vigorously as they have guarded individuals against unlawful ar-
rest." The district court attempted to bolster the logic of its analogy to Bacon
by arguing the need of protect third-parties. First, the district court stated that
the intrusion caused by a third-party search is unreasonable because, in most
situations, a less drastic means exists to obtain evidence in the possession of a
non-suspect.59
 Second, it stated that historically search warrants were directed
solely against suspects. 6° Finally, the district court proposed that third-parties
need added procedural protection, since they lack standing to invoke the
exclusionary rule—the chief deterrent to unlawful seizures."
52
 436 U.S. at 556.
" Id. at 558, 560.
51 353 F. Supp. at 128-30, 132.
55
 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971).
" Id. at 943. The Bacon holding rested on the statutory provisions of Fed. R.
Crim. P. 46(b) (bail for witness) and 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1976) (release of material wit-
ness).
57 353 F. Supp. at 129, 132.
58 Id. at 130, 132.
59 353 F. Supp. at 130-31.
" 353 F. Supp. at 131. But cf. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 292
U.S. 344, 356-57 (1931) (fourth amendment "protects all, those suspected or known to
be offenders as well as the innocent ...").
65 353 F. Supp. at 131-32. The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy
to safeguard fourth amendment privacy rights through the deterrence of future un-
lawful police conduct. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974). In most
cases, it renders evidence seized in violation of defendant's constitutional rights inad-
missible in a criminal prosecution. E.g., Weeks v. United States 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-58 (1960). This rule may not be vicariously
asserted, but can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the
search itself. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229-30 (1973); Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969). Recently, the Court has raised serious doubts
about the exclusionary rule's efficacy, see United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 453-54
(1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 n.32, 493 n.34 (1976), and the rule itself
may be abandoned. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.at 499-502 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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The Supreme Court primarily criticized the district court's holding as an
attempt to strike a balance between privacy and public need when that
balance already is ensured by the fourth amendment itself.62
 The Court sum-
marily rejected the notion that search and seizure of third-party property re-
quires more careful fourth amendment consideration because of the unavaila-
bility of the exclusionary rule. 63 Seldom would the state be so convinced of a
party's lack of standing to suppress evidence, reasoned the Court, that it
would act without regard for the party's fourth amendment rights." The
Court further admonished that seemingly innocent third-parties may not be
blameless, but in fact, may be related, sympathetic, or vulnerable to the crimi-
nal." In any event, the Court reasoned, the law enforcement interest in seiz-
ing evidence remains constant whether the owner is implicated or not,
whereas the delay and warning inherent in the use of a subpoena would more
frequently result in the loss of evidence." Given these policy considerations,
the Court concluded that a rule restraining the use of search warrants against
third-parties would likely sacrifice an effective law enforcement tool for an
uncertain gain of privacy."
In summary, as a result of Zurcher, the property of a third-party is subject
to search and seizure as in any other instance where officials seek evidence
relevant to a criminal investigation. Zurcher authorizes a search of any prop-
.
erty, regardless of the status of its owner, when a warrant specifically describ-
ing the premises to be searched and objects to be seized, is issued by a neutral
magistrate, after presentment of an affirmation as well as a finding of proba-
ble cause.
C. Analysis of the Zurcher Standard
The Zurcher standard—the Supreme Court's first direct pronouncment of
the guidelines for third-party searches and seizures—is premised upon the
belief that traditional fourth amendment standards can provide adequate pro-
tection to innocent parties from the intrusion of a search. Four factors contrib-
uted heavily to the Court's unwillingness to adopt new procedures. First, a
probable cause inquiry is not concerned with the property owner's guilt or
63 436 U.S. at 554 n.5, 559.
63 Id. at 562 n.9. In doing so, the Court relied upon the earli& decision of
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), which declined to extend the
exclusionary rule to defendants whose own fourth amendment rights had not been
infringed. The Alderman holding was premised upon the conclusion that any increased
deterrent effect on illegal seizures due to such an extension would not justify the con-
current reduction of law enforcement efficiency. Id. at 174-75. In any event, the
Zurcher Court reasoned that it would be placing the cart before the horse to prohibit
reasonable searches because of a perception that the existing exclusionary rules are in-
capable of deterring illegal searches. 436 U.S. at 562 n.9.
64 id
65 Id. at 561.
66 Id. at 560-61. Besides the motion to quash, a third-party recipient of a sub-
poena has the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination available as a de-
fense. Id. at 561 n.8.
67 Id. at 560-61.
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innocence. Second, there is a lack of precedent for requiring a demonstration,
in each case, that the use of a subpoena in lieu of a search would endanger
the recovery of evidence. Third, it is difficult for courts successfully to distin-
guish innocent, cooperative third-parties from unidentified suspects. Finally,
in the Court's opinion, a rule requiring the use of a subpoena unless proven
impracticable would achieve, at best, an uncertain gain in privacy, while the
cost to criminal investigation would be high.
The conclusions of the Zurcher Court are too facile and complacent.
While precedent may favor the Court's holding, the decision ignores the basic
principles underlying the fourth amendment—the principles of privacy and
reasonableness. Indeed, by limiting its analysis to the property-oriented in-
quiry of probable cause, the Court avoided the more compelling question
whether the search and seizure of a third-party is reasonable under the fourth
amendment.
It is well settled that the core purpose of the fourth amendment is pro-
tection of individual privacy through the prohibition of unreasonable govern-
mental interferences." The two primary criteria for defining a permissible
governmental interference with individual privacy are the separate con-
cepts of reasonableness and probable cause. Probable cause is a before-the-fact
determination of cause to issue a search warrant. Traditionally, a finding of
probable cause to search requires two conclusions. First, there must be a
proper showing that a crime has been committed and that a nexus exists be-
tween that crime and the objects or evidence sought. 69
 Second, it must be
demonstrated that the objects sought are within the place or on the premises
to be searched.'" In contrast, reasonableness is usually an after-the-fact
68
 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 377 (1976) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147
(1925). The fourth amendment, however, does not establish a general constitutional
right of privacy. As virtually every governmental action interferes with personal pri-
vacy to some extent, the question becomes whether that interference is forbidden by
some command of the constitution. While the fourth amendment protects the indi-
vidual from only unreasonable governmental searches or seizures, the first, third, and
fifth amendments protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental intru-
sion. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 & n.4-5 (1967) (fourth amendment
expectation of privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965)
("penumbral" right of marital privacy). The shield of the fourth amendment adheres
to the person, not to a particular place, and whenever an individual may harbor a
reasonable expectation of privacy he is entitled to be free from unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusion. 389 U.S. at 351-52.
" Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 162 (1925); see also Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows
on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Cm. L. REV. 664, 687 (1961).
7° Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 535 ("[a] search for [stolen or con-
traband] goods, even with warrant, is 'reasonable' only when there is 'probable cause'
to believe that they will be uncovered in a particular dwelling."). See also, Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. at 158-59 (the right of search and seizure "[is] dependent on
the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the au-
tomobile offend against the law"); Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441 (1925);
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN, L. Rev. 349, 358 (1974).
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evaluation of the scope of the intrusion and the manner of the seizure.",
There is no ready method for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search, considering all facts and circumstances, against
the degree of the invasion of privacy caused by the search." Of the two,
reasonableness is the broader standard." Indeed, the Court itself has de-
scribed probable cause as simply the measure of the reasonableness of a par-
ticular warrant to search. 74 Therefore, an intrusion may be held unreason-
able and, thus, impermissible under the fourth amendment, despite an earlier
showing of sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant. 75
71
 The following cases illustrate some considerations which factor into a find-
ing of reasonableness. (1) quantity of items seized, e.g., Kremen v. United States, 353
U.S. 346, 347-48 (1957) (per curiam) (contents of cabin); (2) nature of items seized, e.g.,
Roden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501 (1973) (film); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 471 (1971) (contraband, stolen, or dangerous goods); Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) (blood); (3) presence of warrant, Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (warrantless search per se unreasonable); (4) trans-
gression of warrant authority, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 570-71 (1969)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (seizure of obscene film under color of warrant to seize
bookmaking material); (5) manner of seizure, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at
771-72 (taking of blood in hospital environment by accepted medical practices);
(6) unnecessary forceful conduct, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 645 (1961) (forcible
entry, battery); cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1968) (frisk); (7) police subter-
fuge, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549-50 (1968) (false warrant);
(8) existence of cause, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21 (specific, articulable facts); Cupp
v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 293 (1973) (probable cause to arrest); (9) place of search,
e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 378 U.S. 873 (1975) (U.S. border); United States
v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803-04 (1974) (in police custody); Chime' v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 767-68 (1967) (home); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 1153 (1925)
(automobile); (10) purpose of search or seizure, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 436
U.S. 307, 320 (1978) (administrative); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,
375-76 (1976) (inventory); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. at 295-6 (1973) (prevent destruc-
tion of evidence); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 30 (prevent crime).
72
	 v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). In Camara, area-
wide building code enforcement inspections were held reasonable in light of (1) their
long history of judicial and public approval, (2) the high degree of public interest in
effective code inspections, and (3) the relatively limited invasion of citizen's privacy.
387 U.S. at 537; accord, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372-73, 375 (1976).
73 In the past, the relationship between the standards of reasonableness and
probable cause was debated. Compare Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705
(1948) (must adhere to warrant clause whenever reasonably practicable) with United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950) (satisfaction of the warrant) require-
ment is not the sine qua non of the reasonableness of a search). Presently, however,
reasonableness is accepted as the overriding test. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S.
800, 807 (1974) (test is "not whether it was reasonable to procure a search warrant, but
whether the search itself was reasonable ...."); Cady, Warden v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433, 439 (1973). But see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 381 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring).
74 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 534.
75 436 U.S. at 559-60. The Court in Zurcher stated that reasonableness is the
fundamental limitation on searches.
[A ruling that the warrant clause is adequate to protect third parties] is not
to question that "reasonableness" is the overriding test of compliance with
the Fourth Amendment or to assert that searches, however or whenever
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The Zurcher Court did not fully evaluate the reasonableness of subjecting
innocent third-parties to search and seizure, ending its inquiry, as it did, upon
finding satisfactory compliance with basic warrant requirements. In the ordi-
nary search situation encountered under the fourth amendment—the situa-
tion where property possessed by the suspect is the target of the search—
satisfactory compliance with probable cause and the other warrant require-
ments usually satisfies the reasonableness requirement as well. This is because
when the property owner is a suspect in the criminal investigaion, it is reason-
able to presume that out of self-interest that person may interfere with the
state's recovery. of the evidence.
The same presumption of a criminal motive to impede law enforcement
is not equally valid, however, where the property owner is an innocent third-
party. Recall that prior to Warden v. Hayden," case law protected third-parties
from searches by confining the character of seizable goods to contraband, sto-
len property, and instrumentalities of crime. 77 The seizure of these in-
criminating objects invariably was reasonable, since their possession alone
created cause to believe either that the possessor was involved in the crime or
that he would destroy or dispose of the goods, if given notice of the intended
seizure. 78 This presumption is sufficiently reasonable to justify a forcible in-
trusion into individual privacy. The Hayden Court's extension of search war-
rant authority to embrace the seizure of all evidence, however, lacked the
justification of the prior rule. Mere possession of evidence relevant to a crimi-
nal investigation does not support a presumption that, if given notice, the
possessor will conceal or destroy the object of the intended search. Usually, it
is in this regard—the mere possession of relevant evidence—that third-party
property gains the attention of law enforcement authorities. Admittedly, the
task of distinguishing third-parties from criminal suspects can be difficult and
uncertain at times. Warrants are issued, typically, at early stages of the inves-
tigation. Further investigation may develop facts which cast suspicion upon
executed, may never be unreasonable if supported by a warrant issued on
probable cause and properly identifying the place to he searched and the
property to be seized.
Id. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1968) ("... a search which is reasonable at its
inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity or
scope.").
" See text at notes 35-39 supra.
" See text and notes at note 35 supra. The rationale behind this rule was that
to justify seizure, the government must have a property claim in the seized .goods
superior to that of the possessor. Gouled v. United States, 225 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
Abandonment of the property rationale of Gouled occurred as courts began to perceive
that the state had an important interest in criminal investigation and prosecution re-
gardless of the presence or absence of a proprietary interest. Id. at 306. See, e.g.,
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966). Moreover, the "mere evidence"
distinction had little rationality because, depending upon the circumstances, the very
same papers and effects may be mere evidence in one case and an instrumentality in
another. See generally, Comment, Limitations on Seizure of "Evidentiary" Objects: A Rule in
Search of a Reason. 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 319, 320-22 (1953).
78 See 436 U.S. at 581 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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prior seemingly innocent parties. Nevertheless, there are many circumstances
in which a party's innocence is undoubted. The files of doctors, lawyers, mer-
chants, customers, or journalists may contain information relevant to a crimi-
nal investigation.'" These innocent third-parties lack the criminal motive to
impede the investigation. Therefore, without some demonstration of a motive
for withholding the evidence, a search and seizure of a third-party's property
is an unreasonable invasion of privacy."
Moreover, the traditional rationale for search and seizure contrasts sharp-
ly with the facts of Zurcher. Traditionally, a warrant is issued in situations
demanding prompt action." The ex parte nature of the warrant procedure is
to avoid giving warning of the search to those in control of the place to be
searched." This is because of the obvious danger that a criminal will destroy
or hide evidence or fruits of his crime." In contrast, neither the Daily nor
any of its staff was suspected of participating in the assault and the warrant
application showed only probable cause to believe that the evidence sought
would be found in the Daily's office. The evidence was not contraband but
photographs made in the normal course of business. There was no urgent or
emergency need to search; nor was there a showing before the magistrate that
the Daily would likely not honor a subpoena or that it would attempt to de-
stroy the photographs sought." Under these circumstances search and sei-
zure seems to be an excessively intrusive means of criminal investigation.
A third-party search situation, like Zurcher, is so different from those or-
dinarily encountered under the fourth amendment that something more than
mere compliance with the warrant requirements should be shown before a
warrant may issue. The Hayden Court, in overruling prior law which protected
innocent third-parties, recognized the potential need to re-evaluate the roles
of probable cause and reasonableness in the third-party search situation." As
noted above, the Zurcher Court chose not to undertake this re-evaluation.
Perhaps, the basic reason for this decision was the lack of precedent support-
ing a change in fourth amendment procedure. To draw such a conclusion,
however, the Court would have to overlook its use of the reasonableness
clause in past decisions. Frequently, when faced with a new factual situation of
search and seizure the Court has employed the reasonableness test to deter-
mine whether the government action was a permissible privacy intrusion. 86 So
?" Moreover, such unnecessary seizures border upon a deprivation of property
without due process notice or opportunity for hearing. 436 U.S. at 581-82 & n,9 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
" See generally, 436 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8 ' Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 n.30 (1972).
82
	 Accord, American Law Institute, A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Pro-
cedure, Section 220.1(6), Note at 38 (1972).
" Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 93 n.30; American Law Institute, Section
220.1(6), Note at 38.
8 ' But cf. The Daily's non-cooperation policy statement at note 14 SUPTa
See note 39 supra.
89 See text and notes at notes 89-94 infra. The area of fourth amendment law
where the Court has acted principally under the authority of the reasonableness clause
has been the law of warrantless search and seizure. Subject to a handful of well de-
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that the fourth amendment may adapt to these new situations, the reasona-
bleness standard is purposely vague and flexible," demanding only that the
justification for the search and seizure match the degree of the intrusion."
For example, in Terry v. Ohio," the Court held that a police officer may
stop and frisk a person for the limited purpose of discovering concealed
weapons, provided that the officer is able to point to specific articulable facts
which reasonably warrant the intrusion." Applying the reasonableness test in
Terry, the Court reasoned that as the intrusion was somewhat less than ordi-
nary, it was reasonable for the officer to search and seize upon a standard
somewhat short of traditional probable cause." Similarly, in Schmerber v.
California," the Court upheld the reasonableness of a blood extraction, for
the purpose of determining the defendant's level of intoxication, upon a clear
showing that such evidence would be found. 93 Again, as the intrusion was
lineated exceptions, warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable. Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971). Where exceptions have been created, it
is the rule that the scope of a warrantless search must be strictly circumscribed by the
exigency which justifies its initiation. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 27 (1968) (stop and
frisk search reasonable). Accord, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 & n.2 (1973)
(samples from under murder suspect's fingernails is a sufficiently limited intrusion);
Chime! v. State of California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1969) (absent a warrant, search of
defendant's home incident to his arrest is unreasonable).
For an enumeration of permissible warrantless search situations see the introduc-
tory discussion in Lewis, Justice Stewart and Fourth Amendment Probable Cause: "Swing
Voter" or a Participant in a "New Majority"? 22 LOYOLA L. REV. 713, 717-18 (1976), and
cases cited therein. Characteristically, such an exigency turns upon the reasonable be-
lief that the evidence will be lost or destroyed. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969). "Wheri an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the officer to search for and seize
any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruc-
tion." Id. at 762-63. Accord, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295-6 (1973) (sufficient
danger that evidence under murder suspect's fingernails would be destroyed); United
States v. Chadwick 433 U.S. I, 14-15 (1977) (warrantless search of luggage seized inci-
dent to arrest is unreasonable if there is no danger that persons will be harmed or
evidence destroyed). Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (warrantless
search of automobile reasonable because the vehicle may be moved out of the jurisdic-
tion before a warrant is issued),
87 See Berger v. State of New York, 388 U.S. 41, 75 (1967) (Black, J., dissent-
ing).
" Id. at 69 (Stewart, J., concurring). Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968)
("any ... search [must] be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its
initiation .").
89 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
96 Id. at 21, 27, 30-31.
" Id. at 24-27. Limited searches upon less than traditional probable cause have
also been approved in the administrative search area. Marshall, Sec. of Labor v. Bar-
low's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1978) (OHSA); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 537-39 (1967) (building code—private property); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541, 545-46 (1967) (building code—commercial property).
92 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
93 Id. at 768-71, Schmerber, validated the taking of a blood sample from the
petitioner without a warrant upon the basis of (1) the existence of probable cause for
arrest for drunken driving, (2) the time constraints created by the competing needs to
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greater than the intrusion of an ordinary search and seizure, the Schmerber
Court, applying the reasonableness test, demanded greater justification than
traditional probable cause. 94 The standard of reasonableness used in the line
of authority represented by Terry and Schmerber is applicable to the third-party
search situation." As in other new situations faced by the Court, the stan-
dard of probable cause needs to be modified before third-party search and
seizure may be reasonable.
If the reasonableness test is applied to third-party search and seizure,
then before a warrant may issue, the state must show that the justification for
the search of third-party property is commensurate with the intrusion. Be-
cause third-parties may claim no greater privacy rights than suspects, the in-
trusion of a third-party search or seizure is of the same magnitude as the
intrusion of a suspect search or seizure." The proper focus of the reason-
ableness question, then is the state's justification for the intrusion of privacy.
Yet as noted above, the justification for searching third-party property merely
upon probable cause is far less than that supporting a search of suspect prop-
erty.97 In summary, unless the state can supplement its demonstration of
probable cause to believe that the objects sought are located upon third-party
property with a demonstration or presumption of a motive to impede the
criminal investigation, search and seizure of third-party property is an un-
reasonable state intrusion.
hospitalize the petitioner and to investigate the scene of the accident, and (3) the pres-
ence of a clear indication that, in fact, evidence of intoxication would be found. Id.
(emphasis added).
94 Id.
95 On the basis of Terry, Camara, and Schmerber, several commentators have
suggested that the Court apply a sliding scale to judge the reasonableness of a search.
See, McKenna, The Constitutional Protection of Private Papers: The Role of a Hierarchical
Fourth Amendment, 53 IND. L. J. 55, 70-76 (1977-78); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 390-93 (1974).
96 However, a recent commentator has argued that some items have a greater
privacy value than others, and therefore, that the level of protection from search and
seizure should be based upon the content of the seizure. See McKenna, Constitutional
Protection of Private Papers: The Role of a Hierarchical Fourth Amendment, 53 IND. L. J. 55,
70-76 (1978); cf. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501 (1973) ("A seizure reasonable
as to one type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a different setting or
with respect to another kind of material"). But cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
301-02 (1967) ("Privacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to a purely eviden-
tiary object than it is by a search directed to an instrumentality, fruit, or contraband").
An argument follows naturally from McKenna's content-based analysis that some
third-party property is more private and more protected against seizure. The best
example is private papers which are little more than an extension of the owner's per-
son, the search for which invariably partakes of the character of a general search, and
which are also often within the bounds of first and fifth amendment protection. 53
IND. L. J. at 68-69. Reputation is another third—party privacy interest endangered by
the Zurcher holding, since damage to one's reputation may follow as a consequence of
the search of one's home for criminal evidence. See Comment, Search and Seizure in the
Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Cut. L. REV. 664, 701 (1961).
97 See text at notes 75-80 supra.
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A similar standard for fourth amendment procedure was proposed by
Justice Stevens in his dissent to the Zurcher opinion. Justice Stevens advocated
a rule which would modify the probable cause inquiry to protect innocent
third-parties. Justice Stevens proposed that a search warrant should issue only
when there is cause to fear that, if notice were given, the possessor would
conceal or destroy the objects of the search." Probable cause to believe that
the possessor is culpable or that he holds illegal goods would, in Justice Ste-
vens' opinion, justify search and seizure." Presumably, a demonstrated im-
practicability of less drastic means, such as a subpoena duces tecum, would jus-
tify search and seizure as well. Justice Stevens' proposal is eminently logical,
for in any criminal investigation, if there is reason to believe the objects of the
search can be obtained by means other than seizure, then search and seizure
is an unreasonable government action.
The plurality of the Court, however, did not agree with Justice Stevens,
ruling as it did that no exceptions or modifications in fourth amendment pro-
cedure were necessary to protect third-party privacy. The implication of
Zurcher is that any person, who the police believe possesses any evidence rel-
evant to a criminal investigation, is subject without recourse to forceful search
and seizure. Zurcher casts the shadow of unannounced search and seizure
upon the lives of countless law-abiding citizens)"
II. CONVERGENCE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT IN ZURCHER
A. The Zurcher Approach to First Amendment
Restrictions upon Search and Seizure
The Zurcher decision represents not only an unwarranted invasion of the
privacy interests of innocent third-parties, but, more significantly, it repre-
sents an overbroad grant of state power to search despite the presence of
important first amendment rights. Zurcher is the first case in which the Court
specifically dealt with the issue of search and seizure of the press. After ruling
that third-party property may be searched or seized if the state closely
adheres to traditional fourth amendment procedure, the Supreme Court next
considered whether the first amendment requires added protections beyond
those provided by the fourth amendment, in instances where the party subject
to search has identifiable first amendment rights. Favoring a rule that a news-
paper may be searched only after a subpoena is proven ineffective, the Stan-
ford Daily asserted that a search and seizure of newspaper property, under a
search warrant, seriously threatens the ability of the press to gather, analyze,
and circulate news)" The Daily's position was that, unlike the subpoena
"" 436 U.S. at 582-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99 Id.
1 "" See text and notes at note 79 supra. As noted in a later section of this case-
note, the warrant issued against the Daily without any regard for whatever journalistic
privileges or immunities that might have applied to the evidence. This suggests that in
the future the Court may approve warrants to search and seize evidence held by pro-
fessionals with recognized testimonial privileges—such as doctors, lawyers, and clergy.
'"' 436 U.S. at 563-64. In argument the Daily submitted that:




process, the ex parte nature of a warrant does not afford an opportunity to
protect first amendment values before seizure.'" This is because the warrant
procedure does not provide an adversary with notice or an opportunity to be
heard upon the propriety of the impending search or seizure. Thus, a deci-
sion to search can be appealed only post hoc. The damage,' however, is irrepar-
able. Specifically, the Daily expressed fears that such minimal protection of
the media from searches and seizures would lead to reporting and editorial
self-censorship, as well as a chilling of confidential news sources.'° 3
The Zurcher Court declined to invoke a rule which would require prior
demonstration of subpoena impracticability as part of the search warrant pro-
cess. The Court remarked that neither'the fourth amendment, nor the case
law regarding its procedure when first amendment interests are present, sup-
port such a rule.'" In its analysis of whether the first amendment requires
modification of search procedure, the Court drew support.'" from two prior
restraint decisions, Stanford v. Texas 106 and Marcus v. Search Warrant.' 07 Both
cases invalidated, as a prior restraint of expression, an indiscriminate seizure
of a large quantity of putatively illegal publication5.'° 8
 In each case, many of
the materials seized were later judicially determined to be protected by the
first amendment.'" Accordingly, these decisions held that a magistrate may
issue a warrant only after carefully determining whether the materials to be
seized fall within the protection of the first amendment, and whether their
publication will he impeded. Second, confidential sources of information
will dry up, and the press will also lose opportunities to cover various
events because of fears of the participants that press files will be readily
available to the authorities. Third, reporters will be deterred from record-
ing and preserving their recollections for future use if such information is
subject to seizure. Fourth, the processing of news and its dissemination will
be chilled by the prospects that searches will disclose internal editorial de-
liberations. Fifth, the press will resort to self-censorship to conceal its pos-
session of information of potential interest to the police.
Id.
'" Id. at 566.
"3 Id at 563-64.
10 ' Id. at 565. The fourth amendment itself, said the Court, was a response to
the struggles between the Crown and press. Aware of this struggle and desirous of
curbing the general search, the Framers of the constitution nevertheless did not forbid
warrants against the press and did not require special procedures for their issuance.
Id.
1 " Id. at 564-65.
"6 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
107 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
105 Stanford v. Texas held invalid a warrant which authorized the seizure from a
private home of some 2,000 books, records and other material concerning the Com-
munist Party. 379 U.S. at 477, 486. In Marcus v. Search Warrant the Court invalidated
the seizure from a distributor of all copies of a large quantity of allegedly obscene
publications, of which only a small fraction actually were judged obscene. 367 U.S. at
731-33.
"6 Stanford, 379 U.S. at 479-80; Marcus, 367 U.S. at 724 (one hundred-eighty of
two hundred-eighty publications were later found to be protected by the first amend-
ment).
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seizure would place a prior restraint upon protected expression."° Noting
that neither case modified fourth amendment procedure in regard to the sei-
zure of first amendment materials apart from demanding careful judicial at-
tention, the Zurcher Court concluded that courts need do no more than apply
the warrant requirements with particular exactitude when first amendment
interests may be endangered."'
In assuming its position that the strict administration of the warrant re-
quirements sufficiently protects press rights, the Zurcher Court expressed con-
fidence in the ability of magistrates to oversee fourth amendment procedures.
The Court was particularly confident that magistrates could anticipate the
type, scope, and intrusiveness of searches which actually would interfere with
press operations.''' In support of this premise, the Court noted that, despite
the absence of a special rule, the power to search third-party newspapers has
never been abused."'
Turning to the Daily's contention that media search and seizure proce-
dure must be altered to prevent a chilling of confidential news sources, the
Court cited the landmark „decision of Branzburg v. Hayes "4 for the contrary
proposition.'" The Court noted that Branzburg rejected a similar claim for a
journalistic privilege to withhold, from a grand jury subpoena, information
acquired in confidence.'" The Court remarked that any added possible dis-
closure of confidential informants by ,media searches, beyond the disclosure
possible through grand jury subpoenas, is de minimus for constitutional pur-
poses."' Through this argument the Court flatly rejected any claim that dis-
11 " The Stanford Court ruled that the fourth amendment's requirement that the
warrant particularly describe the things to be seized must be observed with the "most
scrupulous exactitude when the 'things' are books, and the basis for their seizure is the
ideas which they contain." 379 U.S. at 485. The Marcus Court ruled that the first
amendment demanded, for the protection of the non-obscene material, that there be a
step in the procedure before seizure designed to focus searchingly on the question of
obscenity. 367 U.S. at 732. Accord, Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 506 (1973)
(seizure of film without prior judicial determination of obscenity); Heller v. New York,
413 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1973) (seizure of film before judicial determination of obscenity
legitimate if film is presented for evidence and not destroyed); Lee Art Theatre, Inc.
v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 637 (1968) (seizure of film on police officer's conclusion of
obscenity); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210 (1964) (seizure of all
copies of certain hooks without prior judicial determination of obscenity).
"' 436 U.S. at 565.
112 Id. at 566.
"3 Id. It appears that subsequent to the search of the Stanford Daily, there
have been at least six reported search and seizures of newspaper and radio media
offices. In each case the target of the search was a comparatively small business with
limited resources, there was no allegation of criminal complicity, and the warrant
sought evidence collected while gathering news. Brief for Amici Curiae at 11-12 &
n.6-7, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), reprinted in 9 Law REPRINTS
(Criminal Law No. 24) at 581-82. See generally Note, Search and Seizure of the Media: A
Statutory, Fourth Amendment and First Amendment Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV, 957 & n.3
(1976).
" 4
 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
"5
 436 U.S. at 566.
"" Id., citing 408 U.S. at 690-91.
'' 436 U.S. at 566.
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closure of confidential sources through media search and seizure chilled con-
stitutional rights.
Finally, the Court rejected the Daily's claim that the press should have an
opportunity for notice and hearing before it is compelled to release material.
Although courts cannot validly restrain the exercise of free expression without
notice or adversary hearing,'" the Court distinguished the situation in
Zurcher. In the Court's view, a warrant to search for criminal evidence carries
no realistic threat of putting a restraint upon the publication of ideas, and
thus the traditional need for a prior hearing is absent. 119
 In summary, the
Court rejected all contentions that the first amendment imposes, or should
impose, any protections for media third-parties over and above those pro-
vided by the fourth amendment. As a result, under the authority of Zurcher,
to search media premises, the state is required only to comply with the tradi-
tional requirements of probable cause, specificity, and reasonableness, and to
ensure their proper judicial administration.
B. Analysis of the Zurcher Interpretation of the
First Amendment's Impact upon Search and Seizure.
A closer look at the precedent used by the Court in deciding Zurcher
indicates that its reliance on prior restraint case law and Branzburg was fun-
damentally misplaced. Indeed, the very precedent used by the Court tends to
support the position of the Stanford Daily. The more critical issue, however,
is the effect of the Court's conclusion, based on this precedent, that the first
amendment provides no protection to the media beyond that provided by the
fourth amendment. This critical issue will be explored more fully in an en-
deavor to establish a first amendment basis for protecting media third-parties
from search and seizure—a basis ignored by the Zurcher Court.
The Supreme Court's analogy to prior restraint cases—Stanford v. Texas
and Marcus v.°
 Search warrant—was inappropriate because prior restraint was
neither a factual nor a legal issue in Zurcher. Prior restraint is simply legal
shorthand for the first amendment's special guarantee against orders prohibit-
ing the publication or communication of particular information or commen-
tary. 12 ° Prior restraint was not a factual issue in this case, because all of the
photographs relating to the incident had been published the day before the
search.'" Indeed, the Court itself acknowledged that warrants like the one
issued in Zurcher, to seize newsphotographs taken in a public place, hardly
restrain the actual publication of a newspaper or its communication of
ideas.'" Nor was prior restraint a legal issue in Zurcher. The pivotal inquiry
1 " See, e.g., Carroll v.•President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175,
180 (1968) (ex parte injunction against public rally of white supremacist group is prior
restraint of speech and invalid for want of notice and hearing).
"9
 436 U.S. at 567. In effect, the Court exempted the ex parte warrant process
from the usual first amendment requirement of notice and hearing.
120
 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, Judge, 427 U.S. 539, 556-59 (1976).
121 436 U.S. at 551. See note 6 supra.
122 Id. at 564-65.
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in cases involving prior restraint is whether the matter to be restrained is
protected by the first amendment.' 23 But as the Daily's claim rested upon the
nature of the activities which were disrupted by the intrusion, it was irrelevant
whether the physical evidence which was the object of the search was pro-
tected by the first amendment. The legal issue of Zurcher was whether the
search of the Stanford Daily's offices unconstitutionally hindered the ability of
the paper to gather, analyze and disseminate news, not whether the Daily was
restrained from publishing particular news items.'" In short, Stanford v.
Texas and Marcus v. Search Warrant have no authority in this case, because
those cases dealt with the seizure of materials protected by the first amend-
ment, whereas Zurcher dealt with an intrusive search of the free press.
Branzburg is equally ineffective as authority for the proposition that media
search and seizure does not impermissibly chill the collection of confidential
news information. Neither the facts nor the rationale, which led the Court in
Branzburg to reject the claim that grand jury subpoenas chill confidential
sources, are persuasive in Zurcher. Branzburg sought to determine whether
journalists were required to appear under subpoena before a grand jury and
divulge information received in confidence. 125 Note that the subpoena pro-
cess allows the recipient of a subpoena to appeal to a court for an order
quashing the demand.'" Also note that grand jury testimony is subject to
fifth amendment protection, is spoken in the hearing of a judge, and is consid-
ered non-public until its use in litigation. Similar protections are unavailable
to the subject of a search under current fourth amendment procedure. Recall
that the Zurcher Court excepted the warrant process from the first amend-
ment's requirement of prior notice and hearing.'" Branzburg is inapplicable
as authority because the focused, orderly, judicially controlled disclosure of
confidential matters through a subpoena or grand jury inquiry contrasts
sharply with the indiscriminate search of the Stanford Daily. Indeed, the
Branzburg Court emphasized that the presence of judicial cointrol over the
subpoena process tempered its holding. 12 "
123 See e.g., cases cited in note 110 supra.
'" 436 U.S. at 563. See note 101 supra.
125
 408 U.S. at 667.
126 Id. at 710; 436 U.S. at 561-62 11.8.
127 See text at notes 118-119 supra.
128 408 U.S. at 707-08. In fact, the availability of judicial review was what con-
vinced Justice Powell to join the plurality in that case:
If a newsman believes that the grand jury investigation is not being
conducted in good faith ... [or] if the newsman is called upon to give
information bearing only a remote ... relationship to the subject ... , or if
he has some other reason to believe that his testimony implicates confiden-
tial source relationships without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he
will have access to the Court on a motion to quash and an appropriate
protective order may be entered .... In short, the courts will be available
to newsmen under circumstances where legitimate First Amendment in-
terests require protection.
Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Further, because search and seizure threatens a much wider exposure of
confidential materials and can be appealed only post hoc, the damage is ir-
reparable and the chill generated by the fear of warranted searches is likely to
be far greater than that created by a subpoena. 129
 Although the Branzburg
Court stated that it was not attempting to require the press to publish its
sources of information or indiscriminately disclose them on request, an unan-
nounced search of press offices will often produce this result.' 3 ° Even in
instances where the object sought is particularly described in the warrant, to
locate the evidence in an unfamiliar pressroom layout, the officers conducting
the search must view a great deal of material unconnected with the alleged
crime. And although these disclosures may never reach the courts or the pub-
lic, often the information was placed in confidence precisely to prevent its
exposure to the police. On the basis of these factual distinctions alone, it may
be argued that Branzburg compelled a decision directly opposite to that
reached by the Zurcher Court. Indeed, the Daily was advocating only the pro-
cedural safeguard of a prior judicial hearing upon which the Branzburg deci-
sion was premised."'
Similarly, the policy arguments persuasive in Branzburg lose force when
applied to Zurcher. First, the Branzburg Court presumed that only the confi-
dences of criminals or informers with information about crime would be en-
dangered by a grand jury's subpoena.' 32
 This presumption supported rejec-
tion of a constitutionally mandated reporter's privilege, because the Court
deemed the desire of criminals to avoid prosecution as undeserving of con-
stitutional protection and those genuinely committed to providing information
would not need constitutional protection.' 33
 Yet, because no magistrate, nor
any warrant, can effectively prevent police officers from inadvertently viewing
unrelated material during the course of a search, any and every type of con-
fidential record, not merely those of undeserving criminals, is threatened by a
search. Second, the Branzburg Court disdained the theory, which underlay the
claim for a reporter's privilege, "that it is better to write about crime than to
do something about it."'" Had the Daily claimed that the evidence sought
was privileged from disclosure, and thus completely beyond the state's reach,
the Branzburg case may have controlled this issue. The Daily, however, claimed
only that a subpoena would have been equally effective in producing that
evidence.' 33 Hence, Zurcher did not involve the principle that "the public ...
has a right to every man's evidence," which the Court found so authoritative
in Branzburg.' 36
"9 See text at notes 152-163 infra. But cf. 436 U.S. at 566 (the increased chill
from the use of search warrants, as well as subpoenas, is "incremental" and "does not
make a constitutional difference").
135
 408 U.S. at 682.
131
 436 U.S. at 575-76 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
'' 408 U.S. at 691.
133 Id. at 691, 695.
134
 Id. at 692.
' 35 436 U.S. at 574 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
1 " 408 U.S. at 688, 690.
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In summary, neither the prior restraint cases, Stanford and Marcus, nor
the Branzburg decision control the resolution of the issue whether unan-
nounced media searches unconstitutionally hinder the ability of the press to
gather, analyze, and publish news and opinion from all types of willing
sources. In general, the Zurcher Court's choice of precedent lacks the power of
compelling authority and, indeed, a closer examination of that precedent' re-
veals support for the Daily's contentions.
The more disturbing implication of the Court's conclusion, on the basis of
prior restraint decisions and Branzburg, however, is the implication that the
first amendment offers no substantive or procedural protection against crimi-
nal investigation beyond that offered by the fourth amendment. The Zurcher
Court suggests that the fourth amendment alone, if carefuly administered,
can protect newspapers from unreasonable searches. While it may be more
difficult to show that the Zurcher Court's approval of searches of innocent
third-parties' premises will abridge specific fourth amendment rights, it will be
argued that the opinion's approval of media search and seizure significantly
endangers first amendment free press rights. To this end, it will be submitted
that to prevent an inhibition of the exchange of ideas and the exercise of
expression, the newsprocessing activities 137 of the press should be protected
from the disruption and chill of a search.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT BASIS FOR PROTECTING MEDIA
FROM INTRUSIVE THIRD-PARTY SEARCHES BC SEIZURES
A. Rationale for First Amendment
Protection of Media Newsprocessing
What is most endangered by a third-party media search and seizure is the
free flow of sensitive, controversial ideas and opinion.'" Not only do all
13? The term "newsprocessing" is a phrase used herein to describe the gather-
ing, analyzing, editing, printing, and distributing of news and opinion. This term is
used because a search and seizure may disrupt not only a paper's newsgathering ability
but also directly or indirectly may interfere with all of the functions upon which the
public depends for accurate and complete information.
138 Promotion of a marketplace of ideas is the pre--eminent purpose of the first
amendment. E.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248 (1974)
("marketplace of ideas"); Mills v, Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("free discussion
of governmental affairs"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("unfettered
interchange of ideas"). A free exchange of information is essential for enlightened
self-government, individual self-fulfillment, and the peaceful venting of discontent.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
History, however, documents the tendency of governments to suppress the ex-
pression of those who most fervently dispute its policies. United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 294, 314 (1972). For example, the period of 1969-1971 wit-
nessed a dramatic rise in the use of subpoenas against the press. The cause was quite
clearly the government's prosecution of the vituperative radical movements. Note, The
Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 160, 162-64 (1976); Ervin, In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. LEGIS. 233,
243-45 (1974); Comment, The Newsman's Privilege: Protection of Confidential Sources of
Information against Government Subpoenas, 15 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 181, 182-85 (1970). There
is no reason for presuming that a similar phenomena cannot occur if media search




citizens have a constitutional right to speak out in print,' 39 the public has a
constitutional right to hear their message.'" Without an unfettered press,
the public's right to know would be an empty concept."' The press, as a
major branch of the news media, is a significant, if not indispensible, element
in the network of information. The press is, in effect, the public's informa-
tional agent and an important means by which the public receives information
and ideas essential to its self-government and self-fulfillment.'" Stifling the
I" Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(full and free discussion even of ideas we hate encourages the testing of our own
prejudices and preconceptions); accord, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). In Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1960) the Court recognized the right of citizens to speak out while re-
maining anonymous, when forced identification might bring reprisal and deter peace-
ful discussions of public matters of importance. Id. at 64-65. The chill of anonymous
sources not only robs the public of potentially important information but may be a
violation of freedom of speech as well. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
at 266.
14" The right to receive information has been the basis of the holdings in Pro-
cunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974) (addressee has right to receive uncen-
sored mail from prison inmates) and Lamont, DBA Basic Pamphlets, v. Postmaster
Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (public has first amendment right to receive "com-
munist political propaganda" arriving in mails from abroad). In Lamont, Justice Bren-
nan stated that "[tihe dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise
willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren
marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers." 381 U.S. at 308 (Brennan,
J., concurring). See, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 32 (1978) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 756 (1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65, 771 (1972); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
191 Grosjean v. American Press, Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (tax
based on circulation invalid). While the Supreme Court has not openly declared a right
to know, nevertheless, the concept is present in the rationale of many of its decisions.
In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the Court stated that the liberties of the
first amendment must be broadly construed in order that they may "supply the public
need for information and education with respect to the significant issues of the times."
Id. at 101-02. Accord, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967); Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19
(1966). The "principal that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open" is so strong that the Court has indicated that speech may be protected
even when libelous, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); and
seditious, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Congressional recognition of the public's right to know is manifest in the Freedom of




An informed public depends on accurate and effective reporting by
the news media. No individual can obtain for himself the information
needed for the intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities. For
most citizens the prospect of personal familiarity with newsworthy events is
hopelessly unrealistic. In seeking out the news the press therefore acts as
an agent of the public at large. It is the means by which the people receive
that free flow of information and ideas essential to intelligent self-
government. By enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissent-
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press will inhibit the flow of information to the public. For these reasons,
press newsprocessing activities should be entitled to first amendment protec-
tion.'"
The issue of the precise extent of first amendment protection afforded to
the press has generated considerable controversy among the Justices. There is
a fundamental division in the Court as to whether the press, as an institution,
should be entitled to greater first amendment rights than the general pub-
Always cognizant and solicitious of the press' informational role,'" a
majority of the Supreme Court, nevertheless, has failed to fully protect all
elements of the media's newsprocessing function. For instance, the Court has
recognized and protected the press' right to disseminate opinion and informa-
tion,'" but despite strong and persistent dissents it has given only lip service
political process, the press performs a crucial function in effecting the
societal purpose of the First Amendment.
Id. But see Chief Justice Burger's caustic criticism of the claim that the press is trustee
of the public right to know. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
749-50 (1971) (per curiam) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
143 Precedent for granting the press extra rights for the greater good of the
people exists in the areas of libel and obscenity. It is solely for the public's interest in
unrestrained debate, rather than the disseminator's interest, that media liability is
judged by a higher libel standard. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964). Accord, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1971); Greenbelt
Coop. Pub. Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1970); cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 389 (1967) (invasion of privacy). Similarly, the definition of obscenity is
worded not to protect authors but the public's right to consider diverse and unre-
strained expression. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418-19 (1966); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-88 (1957).
'" Compare Chief Justice Burger's view in First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring), quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331, 364 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe purpose of the Constitution
was not to erect the press into a privileged institution but to protect all persons in their
right to print what they will as well as to utter it. '... the liberty of the press is no
greater and no less ...' than the liberty of every citizen... ") with Justice Stewart's
view in Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975) ("The primary
purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was ... to create a fourth
institution outside the Government as an additional check on the three official
branches.").
The three most important cases in recent times addressing this issue—Branzburg,
Houchin,s, and Zurcher —were decided by bare pluralities. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438
U.S. 1 (1978) (three majority, one concurring, three dissenting); Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (four majority, one concurring, three dissenting);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (four majority, one concurring, four dissent-
ing).
145 Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,.438 U.S. I, 8 (1978) (media acts as the "eyes and
ears" of the public); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) (press is a "mighty
catalyst in awakening public interest"). See note 142 supra.
148 The government must sustain a heavy burden to justify any system of prior
restraint of dissemination. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714
(1971) (per curiam) (publication); Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233,
244-45 (1936) (circulation); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (distribution).
Editorial independence and discretion as to what to publish is presumptively protected
from interference. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)
(right of reply statute invalid); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Pittsburg
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to the liberty of the press to gather and analyze news.' 47 The reason for this
inconsistency is that, from the majority's viewpoint, the press has no special
first amendment rights.' 48 Accordingly, press dissemination is treated to the
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 386-87, 391 (1973) (purely commercial
advertising is not protected speech but is subject to reasonably drawn governmental
regulation); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969) (radio
station must provide equal time for response to criticized individuals or political oppo-
nents of candidate endorsed). Finally, the press has expanded libel protection. Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1975) (expands application of New York Times
standard to private persons seeking punitive damages); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (public figure must show newspaper published de-
famatory material with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for the truth).
' 47 Although Supreme Court decisions have given constitutional weight to the
right of newsgathering, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681 ("without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated"); Id. at 709 (Powell,
J., concurring) ("The Court does not hold that newsmen ... are without constitutional
rights ... to ... [gather] news or ... [safeguard] their sources."); accord, Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1978); cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) ("the
right to .. • publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.")
(emphasis added), no case has deemed the right of newsgathering significant enough
to outweigh the state's competing interest.
Moreover, it is well established that the press has no special right of access to
information even though that information may be of public interest. E.g., Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 9. The Court has been adamant that nothing in the first
amendment compels the government to provide the media with information or access
to it on demand. Id. at 15; accord, Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc„ 435 U.S.
589, 609 (1978). Thus, the press has no greater access to prison inmates or informa-
tion about prison conditions. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 16; Pell v. Pro-
cunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850
(1974). And it has no special access to trial information. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1965). However, once
the press has acquired information, the government may not prevent it from reporting
what it has learned and what the public is entitled to know. Nixon v. Warner Com-
munications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 609 (press may publish and comment on White House
tapes as made public at trial, but may not have physical access.); Landmark Communi-
cations, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829-42 (1978) (newspaper is immune from criminal
sanctions for the accurate pubishing of a confidential judicial proceeding); Cox Broad-
casting Corp. v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975) (press may publish name of rape
victim made public through trial pleadings); New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (newspapers may publish so-called Pentagon
Papers even though criminally obtained).
The right of newsgathering has great currency in dissenting opinions. E.g.,
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan &
Powell, J J.); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974) (Powell, J. concurring in part,
dissenting in part) and at 841 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 893, 863-64 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 664,
727-28 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, j j.).
148 In the majority's view, freedom of the press is a fundamental personal right
of expression and the press clause "comprehends every sort of publication which af-
fords a vehicle of information and opinion." Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
450, 452 (1938). Much of the reluctance to extend any greater constitutional protec-
tion to the media stems from the difficulty of defining the "press." E.g., Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704-05 & n.40 (1972). It would be patently unfair, if not uncon-
stitutional, to discriminate on the basis of attributes such as circulation or the stature of
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same high protection afforded the public's right of free expression. Freedom
from prior restraint of publication is the primary guarantee of the first
amendment's free press clause,'" simply because publication is a form of ex-
pression. On the other hand, as news gathering and analysis is quintessentially
a media function—there being no public right to gather information—press
news gathering and news analysis merit a low degree of protection. The
majority's exposure of press newsgathering activities to government disruption
or control risks serious abridgement of the public right to know. Because of
public dependence on the press, press activities instrumental in gathering and
processing information and opinion should have first amendment protection
from undue search and seizure.
The facts of Zurcher demonstrate that the search for and seizure of evidence
of a crime, which the press may have inadvertently gathered during the nor-
mal course of its business, may abridge the public's right to know. Although
the search of the Stanford Daily was held to conform with traditional fourth
amendment requirements, it demonstrably chilled press activities which are an
integral part of the news and information network. Specifically, the search
physically disrupted the operation of the Daily, disclosed or threatened the
wholesale disclosure of confidential material unrelated to the search, impaired
the Daily's ability to gather information, chilled confidential relationships,
created pressures for self-censorship, and impaired the credibility of the Daily
as an independent news agency. 15 °
Each of these intrusions tends to reduce the availability of news and opin-
ion to the public and therefore deserves closer examination.'" The presence
of police officers rummaging through the papers and drawers of a newspaper
office can easily impede the workings of the press. A likely result of the phys-
ical disruption of a newspaper search would be a reduction of the flow of
timely information. Press operations are under severe deadlines, and a large
scale search may bring the entire process to a halt.'" A search for particular
the publication. Cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233, 239-40 (1936)
(tax based on circulation invalid). It is beyond question that the courts may not inquire
into the content of the paper except in cases of obscenity or libel. 408 U.S. at 705 n.40.
Opponents of press rights argue as well that any rule creating special constitu-
tional rights for the news media would conflict with the equal privilege—equal protec-
tion concepts of the constitution. State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 248-49, 436 P.2d
729, 731 (1968); Cf. Associated Press Co. v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 20 (1946) (the
established press may not repress others from exercising their rights to publish).
' 49
 Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, Judge, 427 U.S. 539, 556-59 (1976);
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715-17 (1971) (per curiam) (Black,
J., concurring); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713, 716-17 (1931).
' 5° 353 F. Supp. at 136.
15 ' Admittedly, this claim is supported principally by the statements and tes-
timony of journalists who are interested parties by affiliation. News journalists, how-
ever, are the only available, knowledgeable sources of evidence.
152 See Affidavit of Gordon Manning. (C.B.S. Director of News) in Brief for
Respondent Stanford Daily at 18-19, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978),
reprinted in 9 Law REPRINTS (Criminal Law No. 24) at 240-41; see generally Note, Search
and Seizure of the Media: A Statutory Fourth Amendment and First Amendment Analysis, 28
STAN. L. REV. 957, 989 (1976). The potential seriousness of this disruption is borne out
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evidence, such as documents or films, in a busy, unfamiliar, and cluttered
newsroom necessarily involves leafing through and scanning a mass of ex-
traneous material.'" Some of that material is likely to be relevant to other
investigations 154 and some is likely to be confidential in nature.' 55
 Indeed,
matters of the greatest delicacy often reach the public only because the press
has agreed to suppress the identity of the informant.'" Moreover, the inabil-
ity to judicially test in advance the scope and propriety of a search heightens
the potential for needless abridgements.'" Disclosure of confidential mate-
rial, whether actual or threatened, will impair the ability of the press to gather
certain kinds of important information." An impressive scientific study has
by the fact that a recent search of radio station KPFK-FM is alleged to have lasted
eight and one-half hours. See note 113 supra, 9 LAW REPRINTS (Criminal Law No. 24)
at 582 n.6.
163 436 U.S. at 551. According to the affidavit of New York Times reporter Doug-
las Kneeland, "the intrusion of a search is indiscriminate; its scope and propriety can-
not be judicially tested in advance; and the mere possibility of its use renders vulnera-
ble all confidential materials." Brief for Respondent Stanford Daily at 20-21, Zurcher
v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); reprinted in 9 LAW REPRINTS (Criminal Law No.
24) at 242-43.
154
 As the requirement of specificity is being relaxed by the Court, material not
particularly mentioned in the warrant nonetheless may be seizable. E.g., Andresen v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 484 (1976). This exception, however, appears to be limited
for the time being to the seizure of contraband, stolen goods or instrumentalities of
crime in plain view even though those items are wholly unrelated to the offense which
initiated the search. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 471 (1971); Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1947); Seymour v. United States, 369 F.2d 824,
826-27 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967) (seizure of suspected stolen
postal money orders during search for marihuana).
156 The reliance of journalists upon confidential sources has been documented
in several studies. Compare Guest and Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen
Concealing their Sources, 64 N.W.U.L. REV. 18, 57-61 (1969) (Appendix) and Note, The
Protection of Confidences: A Quaified Privilege for Newsmen, 1971 LAW AND SOC. ORD. 385,
406-15 (Appendix) with Blasi, The Newsmen's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L.
REV. 229, 245-53 (1971) (Tables I-V).
In regard to the present case, affidavits filed in support of the Daily asserted that
confidential documents were present in the office during the search and that the offi-
cers were in a position to see these documents. 353 F. Supp. at 127.
156 Although Blasi identifies the publication of information and opinions which
"presumably would not be available for public consumption if the source had to be
identified" as "the most significant use" of confidential news relationships, Blasi, supra
note 155, at 245-46, he later concluded that "good reporters use confidential source
relationships mainly for the assessment and verification ... [of news stories] rather
than for the purpose of gaining access to highly sensitive information of a newsworthy
character." Id. at 284. Nevertheless, confidential news relationships supply important
and controversial new stories. E.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667-70, 672-73,
675-76 (1972) (hashish laboratory; drug abuse; Black Panther Party aims and ac-
tivities); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1395 (D.D.C. 1973)
(Watergate burglary).
"7 See text and notes at notes 125-31 supra.
156 436 U.S. at 551. Because photographers and their cameras are frequent
targets of violence, their ability to record events often depends upon the cooperation
of those who may be photographed, which is more likely to be given if law enforce-
ment authorities do not have access to unpublished materials. Brief for Respondent
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ascertained that reporters regularly use confidential information for ( I) not-
for-attribution quotation, (2) verification of information from other sources,
(3) an estimation of the importance of specific facts and stories, (4) assessment
of the significance of recent developments and future probabilities, and (5)
eliciting on-the-record information from other sources. 159 Confidential
sources may be chilled by the increased threat of exposure 16° and journalists
Stanford Daily at 20, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), reprinted in 9
LAW REPRINTS (Criminal Law No. 24) at 242 n.8.
158  Blasi, supra, note 155, at 245-46.
'" See generally Murasky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52
TEx. L. REV. 829, 856-62 (1974); Note, The Protection of Confidences: A Qualified Privilege
for Newsmen, supra note 155, at 262-74; Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitu-
tional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L. REV, 317, 329-34 (1970); Guest and
Stanzler, supra note 155, at 43-49 (1969). But Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972).
[Me remain unclear how often and to what extent informers are actu-
ally deterred ... when newsmen are forced to testify before a grand jury.
The available data indicates that some newsmen rely a great deal on con-
fidential sources and that some informants are particularly sensitive to the
threat of exposure and may be silenced „ . but the evidence tails to dem-
onstrate that there would be a significant construction of the flow of
news to the public. ... are widely divergent and to a great extent specula-
tive.
Id. at 693-94.
The issue is not whether disclosure will inhibit confidential sources but rather
whether the extent of the inhibition is constitutionally impermissible. The Branzburg
decision has been criticized as demanding an inordinately high standard of empirical
proof of a deterrent effect. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 733 (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Murasky, supra note 155, at 854-56 (1974). Usually "on the basis of common sense and
available information" the Court has inquired "whether there was a rational connection
between ... (the governmental action) and the (impairment of First Amendment activ-
ity) and whether the effect would occur with some regularity." 408 U.S. at 733-74
(Stewart, J., dissenting). In a series of cases where the state's justification stemmed
solely from its police power, the Court required no evidence that the challengeed act
chilled constitutionally protected rights of speech, press or association. Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (teachers must disclose associational ties as condition
of employment);' Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960) (handbills must carry
name and address of sponsors, distrbutors, and authors); Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 153-54 (1959) (requirement that bookseller examine the contents of his shop);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (burden on taxpayer to demonstrate
non-advocacy of disloyalty). Other Supreme Court decisions cited "substantial, uncon-
troverted evidence" to establish an impermissible chilling effect. Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960) (disclosure of membership required for occupa-
tional license tax); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigative Comm,, 372 U.S. 539,
557 (1963) (disclosure of NAACP membership to legislative investigation of Com-
munist activity); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958) (disclosure of member-
ship as foreign corporation). Admittedly, where the state's justification for the chill
rests upon the proper exercise of a constitutional power, as in Zurcher and Branzburg,
the burden of proof should be somewhat higher. However, the empirical data cited
above on the subject generally and the "substantial, uncontroverted evidence" adduced
in district court establish that search and seizure of the press significantly chills confi-
dential news informants.
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may be discouraged from probing sensitive areas of the news ' s ' or from pre-
serving accurate and complete records of their probes. 162 Finally, the possi-
bility of seizures of media information may reduce the credibility of the press
in the eyes of the public, which may believe that newsreporters have been
intimidated into omitting portions of the truth or that the press has become
an unwilling source of government and law enforcement intelligence.'"
These arguments graphically demonstrate that searches and seizures of news-
processing facilities have a negative impact upon the press. There is, there-
fore, a real need for the Court to recognize and protect under the first
amendment this essential press function, so as to ensure the ready flow of
news and commentary to the public.
First amendment protection may be extended to cover newsprocessing,
even though it is not properly communication. Despite the Court's emphasis
upon freedom from prior restraint of expression, an impermissible abridge-
ment of the first amendment does not have to be aimed at communication.
Court decisions have made it clear that it is impermissible for government
action to indirectly constrict the flow of ideas or opinion.'" Yet as dem-
" 1 New York Times national news editor Gene Roberts warned in his affidavit
to the Court that la reporters and photographers believe that the information they
gather will be available to government officials, they will not be eager to get the sensi-
tive story, or to track down the individual who will supply the critical information. And
1, as an editor, will consider carefully before publishing facts, or a photograph, which
might imply that there is more than appears." Brief for Respondent Stanford Daily at
24, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), reprinted in 9 LAW REPRINTS (Crim-
inal Law No. 24) at 246. See generally Murasky, supra note 160, at 862-66; Note, The
Protection of Confidences: A Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, supra note 155, at 390-91;
Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right of a Confidential Relationship,
supra note 155, at 329, 332; Guest and Stanzler, supra note 155, at 44, 46.
162 9 LAW REPRINTS (Criminal Law No. 24) at 246, In an affidavit, the national
news editor of the New York Times stated that if confidential notes are subject to
police seizure, it is likely that reporters will stop bringing them back to their offices
and using them as aids in preparing their stories. I am obviously concerned for the
quality and character of journalism if reporters refrain from taking notes or taping
interviews for fear that this raw stuff might be easily available to government officials
through the device of a search warrant." Id.
163 As stated by one veteran and highly respected newsman:
Perhaps the most shocking aspect of The Stanford Daily search was the fact
that the police were utilizing the offices of the Daily to determine the
availability of evidence. The extension of the news office from a news gather-
ing function to an investigating agency of the authorities is terrifying. Pro-
fessional news gathering facilities cannot be permitted to be used as evi-
dence gathering agencies in either criminal or civil proceedings without
losing all trace of the independence and integrity on which the journalistic
profession is founded.
Affidavit of Walter Cronkite, Id. at 244-45.
164 E.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-17 (1972) (antinoise
ordinance held to be a reasonable regulation of the time, place and manner of public
demonstration); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (statutes which authorize con-
viction for peaceful demonstration as breach of peace and obstructuring public passage
are invalid as applied); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-47 (1943) (door
•
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onstrated above, media search and seizure has an inhibiting effect upon the
communication of news to the public. As media search and seizure so mark-
edly threatens first amendment interests, to protect those interests, first
amendment standards should be applied in addition to fourth amendment
standards. Accordingly, the remainder of this casenote will present a standard
which should be required by the first amendment in a media search situation,
and propose an alternative standard for third-party media search procedure.
B. Standard for Indirect Restrictions
of First Amendment Freedoms
The standard typically employed to review indirect government
infringements of first amendment freedoms is stated succinctly in United States
v. O'Brien:"5
. a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial government interest; if the government's interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; if the incidental re-
striction on alleged First Amendment rights is no greater than is es-
sential to the furtherance of that interest.' 66
When this four-part first amendment standard is applied to a case of media
search and seizure, it reveals that the Zurcher standard is an overbroad grant
of state power and that comparable ends may be achieved under a narrower
standard. First, O'Brien requires that the action infringing first amendment
rights be within the state's constitutional powers. Media searches would satisfy
this first step, because, as governed by the fourth amendment, search and
seizure is constitutional. Second, O'Brien requires that the infringing action
further an important government interest. Prosecution of criminal activity is
an important state interest, and Branzburg indicates that search and seizure to
obtain evidence in a criminal investigation bears a reasonable relationship to
that interest."' Third, the state interest must be unrelated to the suppres-
to door distribution of pamphlets forbidden by municipal ordinance to prevent nui-
sance and crime); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1976) (any significant im-
pairment of first amendment freedoms subject to exacting scrutiny).
If the Court can find that effective alternative sources or means of communication
are readily available, however, then the inhibition of a particular source or means of
communication by a neutral government action may not be unconstitutional. Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817„ 823-28 {1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,
846-48 (1974); Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67 (1972).
165 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
' 66 Id. at 377.
167
 408 U.S. at 700-01. The interests implicated in Branzburg were the state's
interests in "extirpating the traffic in illegal drugs, in forestalling assassination attempts
on the President, and in preventing the community from being disrupted by violent
disorders endangering both person and property." Id. at 701. Justice White writing for
the Branzburg majority stated that the state interests advanced could pass muster under
even the more exacting "compelling" or "paramount" standards. Id. at 700. Cf.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963) (regulation of legal profession not a
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sion of free expression. This aspect of O'Brien would be satisfied if the search
was part of a good faith criminal investigation.'" Although, it may seem
unlikely that a state would intentionally use its power of search and seizure to
suppress free expression, a loosely drawn procedure may encourage the abuse
of search and seizure to harass vocal individuals and organizations. Finally,
the fourth O'Brien step requires that the incidental restriction of first amend-
ment rights be no greater than is essential to achieve the state's purpose. This
is fundamentally a restatement of the "least drastic means" doctrine appearing
in other first amendment cases.'" Under the least drastic means doctrine,
even legitimate government action may be invalid when the chosen means
unnecessarily restricts constitutionally protected liberty.'" In theory, the doc-
trine requires a searching examination of the challenged government method,
but, in practice, the Court has overturned state regulations whenever it can be
reasonably asserted that a less injurious alternative exists for achieving the
same basic purpose.'" Traditionally, the Court has not demanded that the
proposed alternative be as efficient in meeting state objectives as is the chal-
lenged procedure.' 72
The fourth O'Brien step highlights the deficiency of the Zurcher standard
as to first amendment rights in media searches and seizures. Recall that the
Zurcher majority approved third-party media searches upon a strict adminis-
"compelling" state interest to compel disclosure of association's membership); Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1944) (registration of labor organizers not a
"paramount" state interest to restrain exercise of free speech and free assembly).
Where government investigation intrudes on first amendment rights, the Court
has required the state to show a substantial rather than reasonable, relationship be-
tween the information sought and the state interest compelling its disclosure. Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963) (disclosure of
NAACP membership to state legislative). Nontheless, Branzburg also indicates that a
reasonable search and seizure meets either of these burdens. 408 U.S. at 700-01.
168 Cf. 408 U.S. at 707 (grand jury investigation).
188 E.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
ti° Id. "[Elven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgement must be viewed in light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
purpose." Id. at 488. Cf. Martin v. City of Struthers, 3l9 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943)
(ordinance forbids door-to-door distribution of pamphlets to prevent nuisance and
crime); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (handbill ordinance forbids dis-
tribution of all literature as means of preventing litter).
1 " E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1968). "It is not our function to
examine the validity of congressional judgment [that one possible alternative would be
inadequate]. Neither is it our function to determine whether [the rejected alternative]
exhausts the possible alternatives to the statute under review. ... [W]hen legitimate
legislative concerns are expressed in a statute which imposes a substantial burden on
protected First Amendment activities, Congress must achieve its goal by means which
have a "less drastic" impact on the continued vitality of First Amendment freedoms."
Id. at 267-68. See, Martin v. City of Struthers, 3l9 U.S. 141, 147 (1943) (mischief to be
corrected could be easily controlled by "traditional legal methods").
172 See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 493-94 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see generally Note, Eess Drastic
Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 468-74 (1969).
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tration of the warrant requirements. The Zurcher standard does not reflect the
instances when search and seizure imposes a greater restriction upon first
amendment rights than is essential to obtain evidence from an innocent
third-party newspaper. Specifically, the Zurcher Court would allow search and
seizure without any prior inquiry into whether the third-party media source
would honor a request to produce evidence. In conclusion, because of its seri-
ous negative impact upon the free flow of news and information, media
search and seizure is a permissible intrusion upon media operations only if
search and seizure is the least drastic available means of criminal investigation.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ZURCHER STANDARD
As shown above, the Supreme Court's approbation of a loosely drawn
procedure for third-party media search and seizure threatens a significant
impairment of first amendment rights. Nonetheless, one must account for the
legitimate government need to investigate and prosecute criminal activity.
Moveover, as not all abridgements of the first amendment are impermissi-
ble, 173 the question becomes one of obtaining the proper balance of these
competing interests. A majority of the Zurcher Court held that basic fourth
amendment requirements alone, if carefully followed, sufficiently protect first
amendment interests. 174 While this holding might be correct in a case of a
seizure of first amendment material interests,' 75 such a rule cannot protect
first amendment rights when those rights adhere to the individual property,
rather than to the property itself. This is simply because the fourth amend-
ment is concerned with the character and status of the property to be seized,
rather than with the rights of its owner.' 76 In short, the deficiency of the
Zurcher Court's scheme of applying a fourth amendment standard to the
search of a third-party newspaper is that the standard of one amendment
alone cannot fully protect the constitutional interests which lie outside the
scope of that amendment. There is a similar deficiency with an entirely first
amendment standard of review. That is, while the first amendment may gov-
ern when a reasonable search may infringe or not infringe first amendment
freedom, it says nothing about what a reasonable search is nor how it should
be conducted.
Because search and seizure of a third-party newspaper manifests the
convergence of the two amendments, a natural resolution would accommo-
date both first and fourth amendment standards. As a matter of judicial re-
view, the standards of each could be applied individually, but some manage-
able rule must be developed so that magistrates can determine, prior to the
issuance of a warrant, whether the anticipated search and seizure will impinge
'" Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976) ("for the prohibition on en-
croachment of First Amendment protections is not an absolute); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) ("lt is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate
every incidental burdening of the press ....").
"4
 436 U.S. at 565.
' 75 See text and notes at notes 108-111 supra.




first amendment liberties. Therefore, the following standard is proposed. To
properly balance individual privacy with law enforcement needs, the magis-
trate should follow the fourth amendment's standards of a reasonable search
and seizure. However, before the magistrate may issue a warrant to search the
premises of a third-party who possesses clear first amendment rights, the
magistrate must have evidence that a less drastic means of criminal investiga-
tion is impracticable.
In this regard, there appear to be at least two less intrusive alternatives to
search and seizure of a third-party newspaper. The first is use of a subpoena
duces tecum, as endorsed by the Zurcher district court.'" Primarily, a sub-
poena obviates the need to search about in media offices, since it allows the
newspaper itself to locate and produce the document within a reasonable
time. As a result, the physical disruption caused by the presence of police in
the office could be avoided and the disclosure of confidential material could
be closely circumscribed to the specific request. In addition, the newspaper
would have the opportunity, on a timely motion to quash, to be heard on the
relevance and materiality of the requested disclosures and to assert any tes-
timonial privileges.'" In contrast, an ex parte, unannounced, seizure presents
no such opportunity and may include the inadvertent seizure of protected
documents, later determined to be irrelevant to the investigation.'"
The second less intrusive method by which the state may obtain evidence
in the possession of a third-party media source is the vehicle of informal
contact and negotiation as suggested by the regulations of the United States
Attorney General as to the issuance of media subpoenas."° These regula-
tions are prefaced with a statement that the prosecutorial power of the federal
government should not be used to impair the media's responsibility to broadly
cover controversial public issues. 18 ' To that end, the Attorney General's reg-
ulations require that, prior to subpoenaing a representative of the news
media, the justice department must have made all reasonable attempts to ob-
tain the information from non-media sources, and negotiations with the
media must be fully exhausted. 1 S2
 No justice department official may subpoena
177
 353 F. Supp. at 132-33.
'" In the case at hand, the search was wholly avoidable as, in fact, the items to
be seized did not exist. 436 U.S. at 551-52. Compare Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at
710 (Powell, J., concurring in 5 to 4 decision) with 436 U.S. at 561-62, n.8, 567.
17° Cf. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 467 (1976) (sixty-two of ninety
documents seized were later found irrelevant); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S.
717, 724 (1961) (one hundred-eighty of two hundred-eighty publications seized were
later judged non-obscene).
' 80
 Policy with regard to the issuance of subpoenas to, and the interrogation,
indictment, or arrest of, members of the news media, 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1976).
'In Id. at § 50.10(a). In pertinent part § 50.10 reads:
(a) Because freedom of the press can be no broader than the freedom
of reporters to investigate and report the news, the prosecutorial power of
the government should not be used in such a way that it impairs a report-
er's responsibility to cover as broadly as possible controversial public is-
sues ...."
182 Id. at § 50.10(b), (c), (e)(3). In pertinent part § 50.10 reads:
(b) All reasonable attempts should be made to obtain information
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the news media without the express authorization of the Attorney General,
and, even then, the subpoena's purpose should be limited to the verifica-
tion of published information.'" Finally, the regulations advise that a sub-
poena not be used to obtain non-essential or speculative information."' By
means of these regulations, the justice department has voluntarily limited its
use of media subpoenas to avoid needlessly infringing media newsprocessing
rights. The justice department has no similar limitation of its authority to
search and seize media property, since before Zurcher the propriety of media
searches was not established. As a comparison of Zurcher and Branzburg has
shown, however, a search is more damaging to first amendment liberties than
a subpoena as a means of criminal investigation.' 85 Thus, in light of Zurcher,
the Attorney General's regulation of media subpoenas must be extended to
comprise media search and seizure to remain consistent with its underlying
policy. Finally, state and local justice departments should adopt the United
States Attorney General's policy of informally contacting the press before au-
thorizing the use of more drastic means.
An obvious limitation with either an informal contact policy or subpoena
policy is that each alternative requires the cooperation and good faith of the
property owner. Indeed, a primary objection of the Supreme Court in Zurcher
to a subpoena first rule was that the notice and delay inherent in the sub-
poena process could result in the loss of the desired evidence.'" If the less
drastic means doctrine was incorporated into fourth amendment procedure,
however, the state would be able to resort to search and seizure whenever it has
good reason to suspect that the property owner would not honor a subpoena.
Any difficulty in identifying a property owner as a cooperative third-party
could be partially ameliorated by permitting magistrates certain presumptions,
which may include the presumption that relatives or known associates of the
suspect would be uncooperative. A presumption of non-cooperation also may
be reasonable if the third-party media held instrumentalities of crime, contra-
from nonmedia sources before there is any consideration of subpoenaing a
representative of the news media.
(c) Negotiations with the media shall be pursued in all cases in which a
subpoena is contemplated ....
(e) [In requesting express authorization to serve a member of the
news media with a subpoena] ....
(3) the government should have unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the in-
formation from alternative nonmedia sources.
183 Id. at § 50.10(d), (e)(2), (4). In pertinent part § 50.10 reads:
(d) If negotiations fail, no Justice Department official shall request ...
a subpoena to any member of the news media without express authoriza-
tion of the Attorney General.
(e) In requesting ... authorization	 , the following principles shall
apply: ... (2) ... The subpoena should not be used to obtain peripheral,
non-essential or speculative information.... (4) The use of subpoenas to
members of the news media should, except under exigent circumstances,
be limited to the verification of published information ....
184 Id. at § 50.10(e)(2); see note 183 supra.
185 See text at notes 125-31, 150-163 supra.
188 436 U.S. at 560-61.
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band or stolen goods.'" Furthermore, an urgent need for the evidence
should be recognized as a factor supporting the issuance of a search warrant.
Thus, for example, a warrant to seize property in the possession of a third-
party newspaper may be justified if the evidence would directly establish guilt
or innocence, if similar evidence were unavailable from non-media sources,
and if non-cooperation either is firmly established or may be reasonably pre-
sumed.' 88
Admittedly, adaptation of less drastic means principles to protect third-
party privacy and first amendment rights from injury through search and
seizure would create a multiple tier system of fourth amendment procedure.
Magistrates would be required to follow different procedures to issue a war-
rant to search suspect property, third-party property, and media property.
Therefore, in the warrant procedure, emphasis would fall on the identity and
character of the property owner. In addition, in the case of third-party or
media search and seizure, the demonstration of sufficient cause to search
would be slightly increased. But these new problems are justifiable burdens to
ensure the vitality of the flow of information and news to the public, as well
as the reasonableness of an intrusion upon the privacy of a third-party.'"
187 This is not to reinstate the pre-Hayden rationale that the state possesses a
superior proprietary interest in these types of goods. Rather, possession of contraband,
stolen goods or instrumentalities of crime creates a reasonable inference that the third
party may be implicated in the crime and may attempt to frustrate law enforcement.
See text at notes 75-80 supra.
1B8 If the Santa Clara County District Attorney had followed the procedures
suggested by this casenote, the search of the Stanford Daily may have been reasonable.
The need to search the Daily could have been demonstrated by bringing before the
magistrate: (1) the Daily's policy of non-cooperation with law enforcement investiga-
tions, see note 14 supra; (2) the absence of non-media alternative sources; (3) the
reasonable belief that the evidence would be directly relevant to conviction or acquittal
and (4) probable cause to search. See generally text and notes 2-4 supra.
1&8 As of September, 1978, thirteen bills variously modifying or reversing the
Supreme Court in Zurcher have been introduced in Congress. Some are aimed specifi-
cally at the protection of the media. H.R. 12952, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Drinan); H.R.
13169 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Fish); S. 3258, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sasser). Senator
Sasser's bill would permit a warrant to issue only after an adversary hearing of proba-
ble cause to believe that notice would lead to the concealment, alteration or destruction
of the evidence. Under the bill proposed by Congressman Heinz a warrant may issue
only on probable cause to believe that a reporter or news organization had committed
a crime. S. 3225, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Heinz). A subpoena duces lecum is required by
Congressmen Bayh and Quayle's proposals when the party to be searched has a
reasonable expectation of privacy. S. 3164, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Bayh); H.R. 13017,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Quayle). Other bills directed at the search of third-parties gener-
ally would not allow a warrant to issue unless the person was a suspect or a substantial
likelihood that the evidence would be destroyed. S. 3222, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dole);
S. 3261, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Haskell); H.R. 13113, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jacobs);
H.R. 13227, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Edwards). See also, H.R. 13168, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Fish); H.R. 13319, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Railsback); H.R. 13710, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Gudger). See generally The News Media and the Law, October, 1978; [1978] 3 MEDIA
L. RI'TR. (No. 42).
818	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 20:783
CONCLUSION
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily represents a significant encroachment upon the
basic rights of privacy and free press. Condoning third-party search and sei-
zure upon a traditional standard of probable cause is a blind adherence to the
words of the fourth amendment, which ignores the very principles for which
they stand. The decision minimizes the justification necessary to search and
seize, thereby needlessly endangering the privacy of innocent citizens at the
behest of state law enforcement interests. Furthermore, the Court's unwilling-
ness to meaningfully distinguish search and seizure of the press from other
third-party search situations, fails to acknowledge the important role of the
press in keeping the public abreast of news and opinion. Search and seizure
of the press jeopardizes the free flow of information by obstructing the ability
of the press to gather, publish, and circulate news. As regards both issues in
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the Court has struck an unequal balance of the com-
peting interests.
JEFFREY P. BUHRMAN
